Excluding the Pollution Exclusion: City of Johnstown, New York v. Bankers Standard Insurance Company, 877 F.2d 1146 by Ericson, Christine F.
Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law
Volume 38
January 1990
Excluding the Pollution Exclusion: City of
Johnstown, New York v. Bankers Standard
Insurance Company, 877 F.2d 1146
Christine F. Ericson
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship.
For more information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Christine F. Ericson, Excluding the Pollution Exclusion: City of Johnstown, New York v. Bankers Standard Insurance Company, 877 F.2d
1146, 38 Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 287 (1990)
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol38/iss1/13
EXCLUDING THE POLLUTION EXCLUSION:
CITY OF JOHNSTOWN, NEW YORK
V.
BANKERS STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY,
877 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1989)
Aggressive state and federal laws force polluters to pay for personal
and property damages.1 Insurers attempt to exclude such damages
from coverage and limit their financial burden by inserting a standard
pollution exclusion clause into general liability policies.2 This clause
excludes insurance coverage of damages arising from environmental
pollution except when the pollution is "sudden and accidental." 3 In
1. Congress enacted stringent environmental regulations largely in response to in-
creased public awareness of environmental issues. Sive, Forward: Roles and Rules in
Environmental Decisionmaking, 62 IOWA L. REv. 637 (1977) (regarding the formation
of environmental interest groups); cf Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982);
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982); Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1982); Comprehensive En-
vironmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-57 (1982).
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), § 3005(e), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6925(e)(2)(b) (1982), as amended by Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3321 (1984), termi-
nated interim status of all land disposal facilities on November 8, 1985 unless the facil-
ity owners certified that their facilities complied with all applicable financial
responsibility requirements. RCRA requires each person who owns or operates a haz-
ardous waste facility to obtain a permit. 42 U.S.C. § 6925(a) (1982). A facility with
interim status may operate until EPA disposes of the permit application. 42 U.S.C.
§ 6925(e)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See, eg., Grand River Lime Co. v. Ohio Casualty
Insurance Co., 289 N.E.2d 360, 32 Ohio App. 2d 178 (1972) (the insurance policy cov-
ered an insured which intended the release of pollution but did not expect or intend the
damage which the pollution caused).
2. For an overview of liability insurance policies expressly covering environmental
damages, see Smith, Environmental Damage Liability Insurance - A Primer, 29 Bus.
LAW 333 (1983). The Smith article discusses the risks which environmental damage
insurance policies cover and the types of policies available to prospective insureds. See
also Note, The Pollution Exclusion in the Comprehensive General Liability Insurance
Policy, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 897, 905 (the pollution exclusion clause evolved from
decisions such as Grand River Lime).
3. The standard pollution exclusion clause in a comprehensive general liability in-
surance policy (CGL) excludes from coverage:
[b]odily injury or property damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or
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City of Johnstown, New York v. Bankers Standard Insurance Co.,4 the
Second Circuit held that, despite this clause and prior notice to the
insured city of groundwater contamination from its municipal landfill,
insurers were required to defend the city in a liability suit where the
city had assumed a risk of hazardous chemical leakage.5
In Johnstown, wastes from a city-owned dump leaked into and pol-
luted surrounding groundwater.6 The state sued the city under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act (CERCLA).7 The city sought a declaration that their insurance
policy required their insurers to defend and indemnify them in the
CERCLA action.' The insurance companies claimed that a pollution
escape of smoke vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or
gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon
land, the atmosphere or any watercourse or body of water; but this exclusion does
not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental.
Tyler & Wilcox, Pollution Exclusion Clauses: Problems in Interpretation and Applica-
tion Under the Comprehensive General Liability Policy, 17 IDAHO L. REV. 497, 500
(1981) (emphasis added).
4. 877 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1989).
5. Id. at 1152. The exception for "sudden and accidental" pollution discharges is
controversial. Note, supra note 2, at 899. Some courts interpret the language as ambig-
uous. See infra note 23 and accompanying text for discussion of the case law following
this line of interpretation. Others find it unambiguous. See infra note 32 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of the case law finding the language unambiguous; Technicon
Electronics Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 141 A.D.2d 124, 533 N.Y.S.2d 91
(1988), aff'd, 74 N.Y.2d 77, 542 N.E.2d 1098, 544 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1989) (manufacturing
plant could not recover costs of property damage caused by exposure to hazardous
substances). The insurers had the burden of proving that the damage was not "sudden
and accidental." They met this burden by showing that the insureds "expected or in-
tended" the resulting damage. Id. at 134, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 97.
6. 877 F.2d at 1152. The landfill now receives only general household refuse, but
until 1979 the landfill also received various industrial wastes. Id.
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-57 (1982), as amended by the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
CERCLA has become known as the "superfund" law. Its main purpose is the cleanup
of leaking hazardous waste disposal sites. FINDLEY & FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW IN A NUTSHELL 169 (1988). The Act is comprised of four main elements:
First, it establishes an information gathering and analysis system to enable federal
and state governments to characterize chemical dump sites and develop priorities
for response actions. Second, it establishes federal authority to respond to hazard-
ous substance emergencies and to clean up leaking sites. Third, it creates a Haz-
ardous Substances Trust Fund to pay for removal and remedial actions. Finally, it
makes those who are responsible for hazardous substances releases liable for clean-
up and restitution costs.
Id. at 169-71.
8. 877 F.2d at 1147. The companies argued that the city "expected" or "intended"
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exclusion clause in the city's insurance policy exempted the insurers
from defending the city.9 The District Court for the Northern District
of New York granted the insurers' motion to dismiss." ° On appeal, the
Second Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that evidence indicat-
ing the city had notice that the landfill was leaking into surrounding
groundwater did not relieve the insurers of their duty to defend the city
in the state's action to recover clean up costs."
the damages alleged in the CERCLA complaint. Id. See infra note 11 (to allow the
exception to the exclusion clause, damage must be neither expected nor intended). The
insurers' motion to dismiss rested on three key documents which showed that the city
had notice of the contamination problem yet failed to stop it. 877 F.2d at 1151. The
court did not find these documents sufficiently "probative" to meet the insurers' burden
of proof. Id. at 1152.
9. 877 F.2d at 1147. In its decision, the court only addressed the issue of the duty
to defend. Id. at 1148. "Under New York law, the duty to defend and the duty to
indemnify are separate and distinct." Id. at 1146. The duty to defend is broader be-
cause an insurer must defend even if it wins the suit. Niagara County v. Utica Mut. Ins.
Co., 80 A.D.2d 419, 435 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1981). See also International Paper Co. v.
Continental Casualty Co., 35 N.Y.2d 322, 320 N.E.2d 619, 427 N.Y.S.2d 1191 (1974)
(insurer's obligation to furnish insured with a defense is heavy and broader than its duty
to pay).
10. 877 F.2d at 1148. In support of their motion to dismiss for summary judgment,
the insurers argued that the pollution damage was a "known risk," so the city must
have "expected" it. Id. at 1147-48. A leading treatise explains this issue at 1 COUCH
ON INSURANcE 2D §§ 1:5, 2:7 (rev. ed. 1984). Liability insurance is intended to cover
only fortuitous events: "a contract of insurance ... depends upon some contingent
event against the occurrence of which it is intended to provide, even though the event
may never occur." Id. The Court of Appeals briefly addressed the "known risk" the-
ory. 877 F.2d at 1153. Defending its decision not to thoroughly assess the known risk
doctrine, the court argued that no New York case law shows that the knowledge of a
risk makes that risk uninsurable. Id. Attorneys for the insurers address this assertion
in their petition for rehearing:
Contrary to this Court's understanding, the "known risk" doctrine has a very firm
foundation in the law of New York. Section 1101 of the New York Insurance Law
defines an insurance contract to be "dependent upon the happening of a fortuitous
event" and defines a "fortuitous event" to mean "any occurrence or failure to occur
which is, or is assumed by the parties to be, to a substantial extent beyond the
control of either party." N.Y. INs. LAW § 1101 (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1990).
Inherent in that statute is the concept that insurance is not available for an event
which is no longer fortuitous because it has already happened at the time the insur-
ance policy incepted.... In its decision, the court ignored this statutory definition.
Appellees Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing at 3, City of Johnstown,
New York v. Bankers Standard Insurance Co., 887 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1989) (No. 88-
905 1). See infra note 16 (where environmental damage is expected and intended it will
not be covered by the policies).
11. 877 F.2d at 1154. The District Court opined that evidence indicated the city
knew of conditions from which it could expect the release and subsequent damage al-
leged in the CERCLA complaint, yet the city did not come forward with anything to
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When Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980,12 creating a powerful
cause of action against polluters,13 insurers became concerned about
their financial responsibility for remedial response cost judgments
against their policyholders.14 Comprehensive general liability insur-
ance policies (CGL) traditionally allow policyholders to recover clean
up costs when there has been an "occurrence."" For an "occurrence"
to take place under the language of a standard CGL, damage from an
rebut the information. Id. at 1154. The Court of Appeals, however, found that the
occurrences listed in the policy did occur within the policy term of the insurance com-
panies. Id. at 1146. The city's policies with Bankers Standard and Pacific Employers
insurance companies stated that the insurers would defend and indemnify the city only
if the liability at issue arose out of an "occurrence," as defined by the policies. Id. at
1149. Each policy defined "occurrence" as follows:
An accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to the same event, that
results, during the policy period, in loss or damage to your property or in bodily
injury, personal injury, or property damage. Such injury or damage must be
neither expected nor intended by the insured.
Id. (emphasis added). The court reasoned that the insureds had the burden of proving
that the insured "expected and intended" the damage. Id.
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-57 (1982). The Superfund Amendments and Reauthoriza-
tion Act of 1986 (SARA) revised CERCLA by establishing schedules for response ac-
tions. FINDLEY & FARBER, supra note 7, at 172.
13. Section 107 of CERCLA states:
generators and transporters of hazardous substances, as well as owners and opera-
tors of the disposal or treatment facilities receiving such substances, shall be liable
for (a) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the federal or state gov-
ernment "not inconsistent with" the National Contingency Plan (NCP); (b) any
other "necessary" response costs incurred by any person "consistent with" the
NCP; and (c) damages to "natural resources" resulting from release of hazardous
substances.
FINDLEY & FARBER, supra note 7, at 171. Moreover, courts have held that § 107 of
CERCLA imposes strict liability. Id. But cf Glass, Superfund and SARA: Are There
Any Defenses Left? 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 385, 397-99 (1988) (discussing § 107-
based defenses). See also supra note I for a discussion of the evolution of legislative
environmental protection.
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-57 (setting procedures for cost assessment under CERCLA).
See supra note 1 (environmental concern groups and legislation increased awareness of
the detrimental effects of pollution).
15. Note, supra note 2, at 903. Prior to 1966, the CGL insured against injury to
persons or property "caused by accident." Id.; Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 3, at 499.
Some courts required an accident to be sudden; the majority of courts did not require a
sudden event. Note, supra note 2, at 904. See Holmes, Applicability of Liability Insur-
ance Coverage to Private Pollution Suits: Do We Insure Pollution?, 40 TENN. L. REv.
377 (1973) (as courts increasingly found that "accident" included non-sudden events,
insurers realized a change in policy was appropriate). For further discussion of the
development of the pollution exclusion clause, see Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 3.
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accident must be neither "expected" nor "intended." 16 In addition,
insurers invoke a standard pollution exclusion clause, which denies
coverage in cases of environmental pollution except when the "dis-
charge, dispersal, release or escape" is "sudden and accidental.""7
The majority of courts employ a four-step analysis"8 to determine
whether the occurrence falls under the "sudden and accidental" lan-
guage of the pollution exclusion.19 First, courts ask whether the pollu-
tion involved constitutes an "occurrence," focusing on whether the
damage was "expected or intended."20 Second, courts focus on the ex-
pectation element of the word "sudden" in the "sudden and acciden-
16. Note, supra note 2, at 904. After 1966, the CGL covered "occurrences" instead
of "accidents." Id. The post-1966 CGL read:
The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall
become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property
damage to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence, and the company
shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against its insured seeking damages
on account of such bodily injury or property damage, even if any of the allegations
of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent...
Id. (quoting McGeough, Insurance Coverage of Actions for Environmental Damages in
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW - DEFENSE AND INSURANCE PROBLEMS 26 (1977) (emphasis
added)). The 1966 policy definition of "occurrence" stated: "An accident, including
injurious exposure to conditions, which results, during the policy period, in bodily in-
jury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of insured."
Note, supra note 2, at 905. In 1973, the insurers deleted from this definition the phrase
"during the policy period." Id.
17. See supra note 3 for language of the exclusion clause. In 1982, the New York
legislature repealed that portion of the state statute requiring inclusion of the pollution
exclusion in CGLs. See N.Y. INS. LAW, supra note 10, at § 1113, as quoted in
Technicon Electronics v. Am. Home Assur., 141 A.D.2d 124, 533 N.Y.S.2d 91 (1988).
The purpose of the 1982 New York legislation was to encourage New York industry to
handle its hazardous wastes more responsibly. 141 A.D.2d at 142, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 103
(quoting 1982 N.Y. Legis. Ann. at 272). In theory, the lack of a pollution exclusion
within a CGL would prohibit insurance companies from covering environmental dam-
age due to the high cost of liability. Lack of coverage would place all damage costs
directly on the polluting industry. Id. The elimination of this clause from CGLs, how-
ever, does not negate the relevancy of this Comment. Litigation still arises over cases
based on policies which included the pollution exclusion clause. Moreover, its elimina-
tion has prompted debate over who holds the financial responsibility for environmental
damage. Id.
18. See Note, supra note 2, at 907-09.
19. Id. at 907.
20. Id. The court asks whether there was an "occurrence." Id. If the court does
not find an "occurrence" then the pollution exclusion clause is irrelevant because the
policy only covers "occurrences." Id. (citing American States Ins. Co. v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 587 F. Supp. 1549 (E.D. Mich. 1984)).
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tal" exception to the pollution exclusion.21 Third, courts explore the
repeated use of "accident" and "accidental" in both the definition of
"occurrence" and the exception to the pollution exclusion clause to
show that the two are essentially synonymous.22 Fourth, courts note
that while liability insurance does not cover the intended results of in-
tentional acts, the policy will cover the unintended results of an inten-
tional act.23
In Lansco, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Protection,2 4 vandals
caused a major oil spill when they opened valves on Lansco's oil tanks.
The New Jersey Court of Appeals held that a spill may be "sudden and
accidental" under the exclusion clause even if the deliberate act of a
third party causes the spill.25 The court interpreted "sudden" to mean
"unexpected. '26 This took the temporal element from the word "sud-
den" and made the exception to the pollution exclusion clause easily
applicable to a polluter. Moreover, the terms "sudden" and "acciden-
tal" were interpreted to mean the same thing. Defining "occurrence"
in part as "an accident," the Lansco court read the "accident" excep-
tion as identical to the definition of an "occurrence." The court then
determined that the "accidental" nature of the incident must be viewed
from the standpoint of the insured.27 While stressing that the relevant
inquiry was whether the discharge, not the loss, was "sudden and acci-
21. Lansco, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 138 N.J. Super. 275, 282, 350
A.2d 520, 524 (1975). Courts note that the definition of "sudden" includes "happening
without notice or on very brief notice; unforeseen; unexpected; unprepared for." Id.
22. The policy defines "occurrence" as an "accident." The discharge must be "acci-
dental" to fall within the exception to the pollution exclusion. See supra notes 3 and 11
for the contractual language.
23. Jackson Township Mun. Util. Auth. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 186
N.J. Super. 156, 164, 451 A.2d 990, 994 (1982).
24. 138 N.J. Super. 275, 350 A.2d 520 (1975).
25. Id. at 277, 350 A.2d at 522.
26. Id. at 279, 350 A.2d at 524 (citing WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL Dic-
TIONARY (2d ed. 1954); BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968)). The court rea-
soned that the common meaning of "sudden" is "happening without previous notice or
on very brief notice; unforeseen; unexpected; unprepared for." Id.
27. Id. The "occurrence" definition expressly provided that the inquiry of whether
the loss was "expected or intended" must be viewed from the standpoint of the insured.
See supra note 16 for language of a standard CGL. Moreover, the pre-1966 accident-
based coverage policies generally viewed the definition of accident from the standpoint
of the insured. Because the pollution exclusion reinstated coverage for accidental dam-
age, it logically follows that the standpoint from which to evaluate a pollution discharge
ought to be that of the insured as well. Note, The Pollution Exclusion Clause Through
the Looking Glass, 74 GEo. L.J. 1237, 1255 (1986).
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dental," the court found that the damage was "sudden and accidental"
because the insured did not expect or intend it.28
In Jackson Township Mun. Util. Auth. v. Hartford Accident & In-
dem. Co. 29 and Township of Jackson v. American Home,3" landowners
sued Jackson Municipal Utility Authority after pollutants from the
plant's adjacent landfill leaked into groundwater.31 Jackson Municipal
Utility Authority sought to compel its insurers to defend it.32 In both
cases the court followed Lansco and found that the pollution exclusion
clause restates the definition of "occurrence., 33 In the first case, the
court expanded Lansco and held that the relevant inquiry is whether
28. Id. at 279, 350 A.2d at 524. The Lansco court held that the "oil spill" was
sudden and accidental because it was neither intended nor expected. Id. The court did
not discuss whether the ultimate loss was sudden and accidental. Note, supra note 27,
at 1255.
29. 186 N.J. Super. 156, 451 A.2d 990 (1982).
30. No. L-20237-8, slip op. (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Aug. 31, 1984) (unpublished)
in Note, supra note 27, at 1256-60.
31. Note, supra note 27, at 1256. Pollutants allegedly were leaking from the landfill
into a nearby aquifer. 186 N.J. Super. at 157, 451 A.2d at 991.
32. Id. Jackson Township impleaded the Jackson Township Municipal Utilities
Authority (MUA), a statutorily created entity which collected liquid wastes and depos-
ited them at designated landfills, as well as twenty other companies, hazardous waste
transporters, and other public bodies that allegedly deposited hazardous wastes at the
site. Id. Jackson Township alleged that MUA knew or had reason to know that the
liquid wastes it deposited in the landfill would leak through the landfill soil and into
nearby wells. Id. In the first case, MUA sued its insurers to compel them to defend. In
the second case, Jackson Township sued its own insurer. Id.
33. Note, supra note 2, at 907. Courts which construe the pollution exclusion
clause as coextensive with the definition of occurrence generally cite LONG, LAW OF
LIABILITY INSURANCE APP. 58 (1983). Id. According to Long, the pollution exclusion
"eliminates coverage for damages arising out of pollution or contamination, where such
damages appear to be expected or intended on the part of the insured and hence are
excluded by the definition of 'occurrence.'" LONG, LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE
APP. 58 (1983) as quoted in Waste Management, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 315 N.C. 688,
340 S.E.2d 374 (1986). Accord NEWMAN, LIABILITY COVERAGE PRINCIPLES 133 (rev.
ed. 1983) (citing Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. East Windson Mun. Util. mandator, No. L-
15205-81, slip op. (N.J. Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 1982)). But see Hickman, The Pollution
Exclusion Clause: A Hazardous Wasteland in Insurance Law Conference: The Most
Important Topics of the 80"s B-18 (CGL Reporter's Seminar, Apr. 25-26, 1985) as
quoted in Note, supra note 27, at 1260. Cf American States Ins. Co. v. Maryland Casu-
alty Co., 587 F. Supp. 1549 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (if the court finds no "occurrence," the
court does not need to invoke the pollution exclusion clause because the policy only
covers "occurrences"); Buckeye Union Insurance Company v. Liberty Solvents and
Chemicals Co., Inc., 477 N.E.2d 1227 (Ohio App. 1984) (the courts found that the
insured "neither expected nor intended" the release of chemicals into the environment;
this finding established an "occurrence" according to the definition).
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the resulting loss or damage was unexpected or unintended, not
whether the event or discharge was "expected or intended.",34 In the
second case, the court redefined "expected" to mean "knew., 3 1 It re-
quired evidence from the insurer that the insured plant knowingly de-
posited the substances at the landfill before the court would deny
recovery. 36 The Jackson cases illustrate the problem facing the insur-
ance industry. Courts circumvent the pollution exclusion clause for
the purpose of forcing the polluter to pay any resulting damages and
have avoided giving force to the plain meaning of that exclusion.
A minority of courts view the pollution exclusion clause as unambig-
uous.3 7 These courts hold that "occurrences" are not "sudden and ac-
cidental" by definition.38 Giving the language of both CGL provisions
equal weight, the minority position preserves the intent of the contract.
This interpretation encourages insurers to continue to provide requisite
coverage for legitimate "sudden and accidental" pollution occurrences.
It also promotes environmental awareness among the policyholders.
Knowledge that their liability costs will no longer be passed on to the
insurer will force polluters to make a conscious effort to avoid trigger-
ing damage. Stretching the provisional language to an all-encompass-
ing proportion, however, serves to dissuade the insurers from any
further policy coverage.
34. Note, supra note 27, at 1258.
35. Id. (foreseeability was insufficient to label the loss "expected or intended").
36. Id. The term "knew" also meant "intended." Under this court's reasoning,
therefore, "intended or expected" meant "intended." Id.
37. Note, supra note 2, at 922. See also supra note 23 (the ambiguity doctrine).
38. See Great Lake Container Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 30
(1984) (the contamination of soil and water by toxic waste contained no allegation of a
sudden and accidental discharge); National Standard Ins. Co. v. National Union Fire
Ins. Co., No. CA-3-81-1015-D (N.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 1983) (the policy clearly excluded the
claims of residential claimants, who asserted exposure to chemicals through the atmos-
phere over a number of years; the court held that these claims were not sudden and
accidental); Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 315 N.C. 688,
340 S.E.2d 374 (1986) (where a transporter of wastes negligently deposited waste at a
landfill, the court found that the owners of the landfill neither expected nor intended the
damage caused); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Sunnes, 77 Or. App. 136, 711 P.2d 212
(1985) (the court found that because the property damage was not intended there was
an 'occurrence' within the meaning of the policy definition); Techalloy Co. v. Reliance
Ins. Co., 338 Pa. Super. 1, 487 A.2d 820 (1984) (the court found that long term dump-
ing of hazardous chemicals did not constitute a sudden event); City of Milwaukee v.
Allied Smelting Corp., 117 Wis. 377, 244 N.W.2d 523 (1983) (the subjection of city
sewers to acid for a period of from two to ten years provides more than adequate
grounds to reject the city's contention that the discharge was sudden and accidental).
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Techalloy Co. v. Reliance Insurance Co.39 illustrates the minority
view.' In Techalloy, the plaintiffs filed a CERCLA suit alleging that
the defendant company recklessly dumped or stored a hazardous
chemical"1 over an extended period of time.42 The court conceded that
the discharge may have been accidental but concluded that the com-
plaint did not allege a "sudden" event.43 The court stressed that the
pollution exclusion clause unambiguously denied recovery for a toxic
discharge unless it was both "sudden" and "accidental."'  Unlike the
majority view, Techalloy recognized that the pollution exclusion clause
contains two separate and distinct sections.45 The first section of the
clause excluded from coverage certain pollution-related events. The
second part of the clause comprised an exception to the exclusion
where the "discharge, dispersal, release or escape was sudden and acci-
dental." The court stressed the exclusionary language rather than em-
phasizing the exception.' 6 It recognized that the purpose of the
pollution exclusion was to impose financial responsibility on polluters
for their environmental abuse. The focus, therefore, ought to be in
maintaining that objective.
Similarly, in Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Insur-
ance Co.,4 landfill owners sued a waste transporter for negligently de-
positing waste at the landfill.48 The North Carolina Supreme Court
held that insurers did not have an obligation to defend the trans-
porter.49 The court reasoned that neither the definition of "occur-
39. 338 Pa. Super. 1, 487 A.2d 820 (1984).
40. See supra note 33 for a listing of recent cases which applied the same analysis as
that in Techalloy.
41. 487 A.2d at 827. The suit alleged that Techalloy recklessly dumped or stored
trichloroetheline on a regular or sporadic basis from time to time during the past
twenty-five years. Id.
42. See supra note 36 for duration.
43. 338 Pa. Super. at 14, 487 A.2d at 826. The court reasoned that a duration of
twenty-five years may not be "sudden." Id.
44. Id. See supra note 3 for exact language of the pollution exclusion clause with
respect to the "sudden and accidental" exception.
45. Id. at 14, 487 A.2d at 827.
46. Id. See also Note, supra note 2, at 910.
47. 315 N.C. 688, 340 S.E.2d 374 (1986).
48. Id. The transporter of wastes, Waste Management, did business as Trash Re-
moval Services. 315 N.C. at 689, 340 S.E.2d at 376.
49. But see Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Martin Bros. Constr. & Timber Corp., 256
F. Supp. 145 (D. Or. 1966) (the court defined "occurrences" differently). The court
held that the policy covered emission of fly ash from the insured's plant, even though
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rence" nor the exclusion clause required coverage.5° The court
addressed three parts of the policy.51 First, the court determined that
because the insured had not "expected or intended" the leakage or the
damage, it was an "occurrence.w52 Second, the court noted that the
pollution exclusion clause concerned the nature of the damage rather
than what the insured intended, expected or foresaw.53 Finally, the
court recognized that a gradual release of pollutants over a period of
time was not "sudden." 54 Thus, the "occurrence," which the pollution
exclusion removed from coverage, was not brought back within cover-
age by the "sudden and accidental" exception to the exclusion. 55
New York courts traditionally adopt the majority analysis.56 For
example, in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co.,- the court ordered an
insurer to defend a policyholder in an action for negligently installing a
the insured was aware of such emissions and had made efforts to rectify the problem.
The court held that the resultant damage was at best "accidental" within the meaning
of the policy language. 315 N.C. at 701, 340 S.E.2d at 383.
50. 315 N.C. at 695, 340 S.E.2d at 375.
51. Note, supra note 2, at 927. The court addressed the definition of "occurrence,"
the exclusion in the pollution exclusion clause, and the exception to the pollution exclu-
sion clause. 315 N.C. at 695, 340 S.E. 2d at 379.
52. 315 N.C. at 696, 340 S.E.2d at 380. The court reasoned that since the insureds
neither expected nor intended the contaminants to leak from waste materials into the
groundwater, they could not have expected the damages which the leaking caused.
Therefore, an "occurrence" had taken place. Id.
53. Id. at 696-700, 340 S.E.2d at 380-83 (the exclusion concerns itself with the na-
ture of the damage).
54. Id at 699, 340 S.E.2d at 382. The court observed that by focusing entirely on
the aspect of "sudden" meaning "unexpected," "sudden" must be viewed as synony-
mous with "accidental." Such a reading renders the coverage language indistinguish-
able from its exclusion. Id.
55. Id at 700, 340 S.E.2d at 383. A more proper application of the word "sudden,"
argues the court, describes events which last for short periods of time. Id. at 699, 340
S.E.2d at 382.
56. Note, supra note 2, at 912 (quoting N.Y. INS. LAW § 46 (McKinney 1982),
repealed and superseded by N.Y. INS. LAW § 367 (McKinney 1984)) (New York Insur-
ance Law § 46, since repealed, required that liability insurance policies for commercial
or industrial enterprises in New York contain the pollution exclusion clause). Courts
applying the original New York statute utilized the same rationale as in those cases
finding the pollution exclusion clause to restate the definition of "occurrence." Id. See
also Niagara County v. Utica Mutual Insurance Co., 103 Misc. 2d 814, 427 N.Y.S.2d
171 (1980), appeal dismissed, 54 N.Y.2d 608, 427 N.E.2d 1191 (1981) (where plaintiffs
alleged that the insured was dumping chemicals into Love Canal, the court concluded
that the pollution exclusion clause did not apply to insureds who were not actively and
knowingly polluting).
57. 73 A.D.2d 486, 426 N.Y.S.2d 603 (1980).
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gasoline storage tank" after the tank leaked and caused damage to ad-
joining property.59 The court equated "accidental" with "sudden ' '60
and held that if the gasoline leak were "accidental," it could be "sud-
den" even though the discharge was "undetected for a substantial pe-
riod of time.' 61 This made the policyholder's burden easier to meet.
At the time, the state statute mandated the pollution exclusion, 62 re-
flecting a policy encouraging a cleaner environment by eliminating the
opportunity for industry to spread the risk of loss it causes by pollu-
tion. 63 However, the court still upheld the insurance contract and held
that Allstate had the burden to prove its entitlement to the exclusion.
It noted that where an ambiguity exists, courts construe contracts to
favor the insured.6" In this case, the ambiguity existed in the interpre-
tation of the "expected and intended" and "sudden and accidental"
CGL provisional language.6 5
However, some New York courts have recently followed the minor-
ity view and held the pollution exclusion clause unambiguous. 66 In
Technicon Elecs. Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co.,67 for exam-
ple, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, reversed a find-
ing of ambiguity and denied the policyholder indemnification. In
Technicon, a manufacturer sought defense from its insurer to recover
costs of property damage caused by hazardous substances discharged
58. 73 A.D.2d at 487, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 604. The tank was installed at an automo-
bile dealership. Id.
59. Id. The complaint alleged "negligent installation and maintenance of a gasoline
storage tank." Id.
60. Id. at 488, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 604. The court reasoned that the word "sudden" in
liability insurance policies need not be limited to an instantaneous happening. Id. See
McGroarty v. Great American Insurance Co., 329 N.E.2d 172, 175, 368 N.Y.S.2d 485,
490 (1985) (the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, applied its "transaction
as a whole" test in determining whether the term "accident," as used within liability
policy under which recovery is sought, is applicable to a given situation).
61. 73 A.D.2d at 487, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 604.
62. Id. See N.Y. INS. LAw § 46 (13-14) (McKinney 1982).
63. 73 A.D.2d at 487, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 604.
64. Id. (quoting Messersmith v. American Fidelity Co., 232 N.Y. 161, 166, 133
N.E. 432, 433 (1921)).
65. 73 A.D.2d at 487, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 604 (citing Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Bagley, 64 A.D.2d 1014, 409 N.Y.S.2d 294 (1978)).
66. See Technicon Electronics v. American Home Assur. Co., 141 A.D.2d 124, 140,
533 N.Y.S.2d 91, 103 (1988). But see Avondale Industries, Inc. v. Travelers Indem.
Co., 697 F. Supp. 1314 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd, 887 F.2d 1200 (2d Cir. 1989).
67. 141 A.D.2d 124, 533 N.Y.S.2d 91 (1988).
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from the manufacturer's plant.68 The Technicon court stated that the
relevant inquiry is not whether the policyholders expected or intended
the damage but whether they expected or intended the release.69 With
this finding, the court made the burden easier on the insurer, requiring
it only to establish an intentional discharge of toxic waste. The signifi-
cance of Technicon lies in the New York Supreme Court's message that
it will not allow intentional polluters to pass costs on to insurers.70
Similarly, in EAD Metallurgical v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,71 a
federal district court concluded that the insured's disposal of waste
over a long period of time in the regular course of business was neither
"sudden" nor "accidental. '72 The court reasoned that a finding that
the pollution exclusion clause exempts these activities from coverage
would render such an exclusion practically meaningless.7 3 It stressed
that by effectively subsidizing a polluter's activities through insurance
mechanisms, the courts eliminate the polluter's incentive to minimize
polluting. This, the court concluded, contradicts New York's strong
policy of encouraging a clean environment.74
68. 141 A.D.2d at 128, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 93. Technicon is a Delaware corporation
having its principal place of business in Tarrytown, New York. Technicon owns and
operates a plant in Humacao, Puerto Rico, for the manufacture of machines to analyze
blood samples. The underlying action is based upon bodily injury which allegedly oc-
curred as a result of exposure to toxic chemicals discharged from Technicon's Puerto
Rican plant. Id. at 126, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 92.
69. Id. at 128, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 93. The Technicon court reasoned that there was no
allegation of a sudden or accidental discharge in the underlying complaint. In fact, the
complaint alleged a long-standing, continuous and intentional discharge of toxins. A
finding that there was a knowing discharge of toxic wastes into Frontera Creek and
other bodies of water during several years cannot, as a matter of law, be considered a
"sudden and accidental" discharge of toxic wastes. Id. at 144, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 104.
70. 141 A.D.2d at 143, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 103.
71. 701 F. Supp. 397 (W.D.N.Y. 1988).
72. Id. at 402 (words in an insurance contract should be given their plain meaning).
Cf County of Broome v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 146 A.D.2d 336, 540 N.Y.S.2d
620 (1989) (property damages are expected if the actor knew or should have known
there was a substantial probability that a certain result would take place).
73. 701 F. Supp. at 402. See supra note 33 for a discussion of the pollution exclu-
sion clause as coextensive with the definition of "occurrence."
74. 701 F. Supp. at 402. See Technicon, 141 A.D.2d at 142, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 102
(quoting 1971 N.Y. Legis. Ann. at 353-54):
New York State has adopted stringent standards to prohibit despoiling the environ-
ment through the discharge of noxious substances into the water and air. These
standards, which are the most comprehensive in the Nation, go far beyond merely
strengthening and supplementing the common law rules against pollution. As
strict as these laws are, however, their effectiveness could be substantially reduced
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City of Johnstown, New York v. Bankers Standard Insurance Co."
presented the court with an opportunity to define "expect or intend" as
it appears in the definition of "occurrence" and to define "sudden and
accidental" within the context of the pollution exclusion clause.76 The
Johnstown court interpreted "expect or intend" narrowly," holding
that the standard CGL excludes only those losses that are not "acci-
dental."' 8 In defining "accidental," the court focused on the relation-
ship between an intentional act and the resulting damage.79 The
Johnstown court found that the city neither expected nor intended the
resulting damage.80 This was sufficient to require the insurers to de-
fend the policyholders despite the pollution exclusion clause.
The court distinguished "damages which flow directly from an in-
tended act and damages which accidentally arise out of a chain of fore-
seeable events."'" While an intentional act may ultimately cause
damages, the court reasoned, the damages may be "accidental" if the
total situation constitutes an accident.82 In this case, the court con-
cluded that the insurers failed to meet their burden of proving that the
damages were not accidental.8 3
if polluters were able to purchase insurance to protect themselves from having to
pay the fines and other liabilities that may be imposed upon them for polluting.
Id.
75. 877 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1989).
76. Id. at 1147.
77. Id. at 1149-50.
78. Id. at 1150.
79. Id. Although an intentional act may ultimately cause damages under New
York law, those damages will be "accidental" if the total situation constitutes an acci-
dent. Id. See also McGroarty, supra note 60.
80. 877 F.2d at 1151. Following the majority line, the court reasoned that since the
policy defines "occurrence" as "an accident... neither expected nor intended. . .," any
occurrence that is both unexpected and unintended is "accidental" within the meaning
of the exclusion. Thus, only where the insured intends both the discharge and the dam-
age which the discharge causes will be the policy not cover the insured. Id. at 1150-51.
81. 877 F.2d at 1150.
82. Id. See supra note 60 discussing the McGroarty transaction as a whole test.
83. 877 F.2d at 1151. An insurer seeking to avoid its duty to defend bears a heavy
burden. Id. The Johnstown court dismissed the insurers' known risk argument. For a
more complete discussion of the known risk doctrine, see supra note 10. The court,
unable to cite applicable case law, stated briefly that the doctrine was inapplicable in
New York. The New York Court of Appeals decision finding the insurers responsible
for defense of a CERCLA action was incorrect for four reasons. First, the court im-
properly rejected the known risk doctrine. 877 F.2d at 1152-53. Attorneys for the in-
surers have cited the generally accepted case law as well as New York insurance law.
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The New York Court of Appeals decision was incorrect for three
reasons. First, the court improperly equated "expected" with "in-
tended" and "sudden" with "accidental." 4 The "occurrence" defini-
tion states that either intended or expected damage is excluded from
coverage.8 5 Furthermore, the New York Supreme Court in Technicon
recognized that both terms have independent meaning. 86 Additionally,
Technicon stressed the importance of giving effect to each contract
term.8 7 The Johnstown court's view that "sudden" and "accidental"
were synonymous contradicts reason as well as the Technicon ration-
ale.88 Such an interpretation provides polluters with little economic
incentive to alter their methods. It pushes insurers into a comer from
which their escape may be a denial of any future pollution accident
coverage.
Second, the court found the pollution exclusion clause to conflict
with its original purpose.8 9 The court in Technicon found that calling
an intentional discharge of pollutants over a course of years "sudden
and accidental" distorts the plain and clear language in the policy.90
See supra note 10. See also Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss, City of Johnstown, N.Y. v. Bankers Ins., 877 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir.
1989) (No. 88-9051) at 3-7. The city argues that the insurers confused their known-risk
argument with the definition of "occurrence" such that neither become applicable. Id.
Second, the known risk doctrine asserts that the knowledge of a risk makes that risk
uninsurable. The known risk doctrine nullifies insurance coverage where the risk is
known prior to acquisition of the policy. I COUNCH ON INSURANCE 2D § 27 (rev. ed.
1984). "In order to have a contract of insurance, there must be a risk which is specified
or capable of identification, since a risk which is the coverage of the contract is of the
very essence of insurance." Id., as quoted in Petition for Rehearing at 6, City of Johns-
town, New York v. Bankers Standard Insurance Co., et. al., 877 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir.
1989) (No. 88-9051) (en banc). Third, attorneys for the insurers cited an expansive
amount of documentation in support of their known risk argument. Petition for Re-
hearing at 3 (quoting New York Insurance Law, supra note 10, at § 1101). Fourth, the
city did not cite a single known risk case in support of its contentions. The argument
that such a doctrine might swallow the narrower doctrines of 1) concealment and mis-
representation, and 2) damages that are "expected" or "intended" by the insured is
unsubstantiated. 877 F.2d at 1153.
84. 877 F.2d at 1150.
85. 141 A.D.2d 124, 132-33, 553 N.Y.S.2d 91, 96 (1988)
86. Id. at 134, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 97.
87. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of Technicon.
88. For an appraisal of the recent trend in New York case law, see supra notes 54-61
and accompanying text.
89. See Technicon and EAD Metallurgical, supra notes 66-74 and accompanying
text.
90. Technicon, 141 A.D.2d at 132, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 96.
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Providing coverage for unintended damages, claimed to have resulted
from the deliberate long-term emission of toxic substances, rewrites the
pollution exclusion clause.9" It conflicts with the original purpose of
excluding from coverage those who intentionally pollute.92 Moreover,
a court should not vary the meaning of an insurance contract to ac-
complish its own notions of moral obligation.9 3 Equitable considera-
tions will not allow an extension of the coverage beyond its fair intent
and meaning.
94
Finally, public policy mandates enforcing the pollution exclusion
clause. The State of New York has stringent standards prohibiting the
discharge of noxious substances into the water and air.95 The-effective-
ness of these standards is substantially reduced if polluters can
purchase insurance to avoid paying the fines for polluting.96 The im-
plementation of the pollution exclusion clause within the CGL signifi-
cantly prevents such abuse.9 7 The Johnstown court broadened the
exclusion clause in the CGL policy by devaluing the meaning of its
terms. In so doing, it has contributed to the widespread environmental
problem of responsibility evasion.98
Johnstown recognized the terms "expect and intend" within the defi-
nition of an "occurrence," as well as the terms "sudden and acciden-
tal" within the context of the pollution exclusion clause, as being
essentially synonymous.99 By disregarding the plain meaning of the
contract language, Johnstown enables polluters in New York to divert
their environmental damage costs to the insurance companies. 10 0
91. Id.
92. See supra note 61 regarding purpose of the exclusion clause under New York
law.
93. Technicon, 141 A.D.2d at 143, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 103.
94. See id. at 141-2, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 102-3 (citing 1972 N.Y. Legis. Ann. at 353-4
and 1982 N.Y. Legis. Ann. at 272); N.Y. INS. LAW § 46 (McKinney 1982); N.Y. INS.
LAW, supra note 10, at § 113.
95. Id. Deferring the cost to insurance companies will reduce any cost incentive the
insured has to stop polluting. Id.
96. See supra notes 1-3 for an implementation rationale.
97. With the burden of cost resting fully on the insurer, polluters may figure the
price of damage insurance into the cost of doing business. They will have little eco-
nomic incentive to reduce their activities. Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 3, at 520.
98. 877 F.2d at 1146.
99. Id.
100. For a discussion of the public policy implications of placing the full burden on
the insurers, see supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
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Pushing damage costs upon the insurers, however, will undoubtedly
serve as a deterrent for future environmental coverage. At that point,
polluters may have to account for their actions.
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